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The Novelty of Cybercrime is a research problem in criminology where scholars 
are asking whether cybercrime is a wholly new form of crime compared with 
traditional-terrestrial crimes and whether new criminological theories are needed 
to understand it. Most criminological theories focus on the human rational 
aspects and downplay the role of non-humans in explaining what may be novel in 
cybercrime. This paper shows that a sociotechnical perspective can be developed 
for understanding the Novelty of Cybercrime using some insights from 
criminology. Working from the agnosticism principle of Actor-Network Theory 
and a situated genealogical perspective, it is possible to see that a criminological 
vocabulary can accommodate both the roles and relations of rational human and 
non-human actors. This is achieved by proposing the concept of the engineer-
criminologist, developed by conducting a study of the development of 
information security for timesharing systems in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Timesharing security engineers were facing a completely new form of rule-
breaking behaviour, that of unauthorised access and at the same time they were 
constantly using criminological concepts to shape their design of security and 
explain this behaviour. The concept of engineer-criminologists affords the use of 
criminological concepts in the sociotechnical study of the Novelty of Cybercrime. 
Keywords: Novelty of Cybercrime, Actor-Network Theory, Situational Crime 
Prevention, malicious user, information security, engineer-criminologist 
 
 
Introduction 
Cybercrime is one of the phenomena defining our information age. There is however 
not an agreed definition and cybercrime is often seen as an umbrella term capturing a 
variety of activities (Wall, 2001), from cyber-pornography to serious data breaches. 
Different terms such as computer crime or Internet crime are also often used to address 
the very same phenomena. One accepted distinction is that between cyber-dependent 
and cyber-enabled crimes. The former are criminal activities which can only be 
conducted using “a computer, computer networks, or other form of ICT” (McGuire and 
Dowling, 2013, p. 5), for example malicious hacking. The latter are existing criminal 
activities that increase in scale “by the use of computers, computer networks or other 
ICT” (McGuire and Dowling, 2013, p. 5), for example frauds. The common 
denominator between the two is the conduction of criminal activities with computers 
and networks. For many years, criminology has offered reflections on whether 
cybercrime constitutes a novel form of crime, if compared to traditional-terrestrial 
crime. To take a simple example, are a fraud conducted face-to-face and one mediated 
by computers and the Internet the same or different phenomena? In other words: does 
the medium or the environment (computers and networks vs physical space) in which 
the fraud is committed change anything in terms of our understanding of said crime? In 
criminology, reflections about similar problems go under the name of the ‘Novelty of 
Cybercrime’ (NoC). The NoC is an umbrella term capturing whether new 
criminological approaches are needed to understand cybercrimes, or if approaches 
developed to understand traditional crimes are still tenable. Regardless of whether one 
supports new approaches or not, criminology remains subject-centric and the aetiology 
of crime remains the human criminal and her motivations, while the agency of non-
humans is downplayed (van der Wagen and Pieters, 2015). This perspective excludes a-
 
 
priori the possibility that it may be novel configurations of computers and networks – 
the non-human components of cybercrime – that configure completely novel roles for 
rational human criminals.  
 My core interest is not a criminological one. I am interested in the NoC from a 
sociotechnical perspective. This requires discussing some of the limits but also the 
potentials of criminological approaches. Rather than criticising criminology because of 
its subject-centricity and discarding its vocabulary, there is a much better avenue to 
follow. This paper proposes that the same conceptual vocabulary of some 
criminological perspectives can accommodate the study of sociotechnical interactions of 
humans and novel designs in relation to crimes committed with computer and networks. 
The criminological vocabulary is excellently suited for the study of crime phenomena 
and it can add much to a sociotechnical investigation of cybercrime. Moreover the 
adoption of this vocabulary within a sociotechnical ontology can facilitate a better 
dialogue between sociotechnical and criminological research.  
My strategy for connecting a criminological vocabulary with a sociotechnical 
ontology requires shifting attention from criminology to focus on the work of 
information security engineers.  Here, I follow an influential Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) perspective which has noted the scholarly tendency to “split the world up 
into separate technical and social systems rather than appreciate how engineers create 
and run sociotechnical systems” (Bijker, Huges, Pinch and Douglas, 2012, p. xxiii), and 
which seeks to avoid this split. There is debate on how to define information security 
due to a certain vagueness of some underpinning concepts (Anderson, 2003) and the 
unclear differences with the notion of cybersecurity (Voin Solms and Niekerk, 2013). In 
this paper I adopt a definition that was proposed in the context of timesharing systems 
(the case study proposed in this paper), where security was denoting “mechanisms and 
 
 
techniques that control who may use or modify the computer or the information stored 
in it” (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975, p. 1279). Information security and criminology (of 
cybercrime) mostly deal with the same research object: crime and rule-breaking 
behaviour committed with computers and electronic networks. For criminology, the 
problem is to analyse the root human causes of criminal behaviour. Information security 
instead focuses on engineering mechanisms for protection of a system against criminal 
or deviant behaviour, while at the same ensuring the smooth conduction of rule-abiding 
behaviour. 
Using an STS historical perspective, in this paper I will develop the novel 
concept of the engineer-criminologist in order to show how in information security 
engineering certain rule-breaking behaviours are identified, defined and materially 
addressed through what look very much like criminological concepts. At the same time 
security engineers – differently from criminologists – keep the social and the technical 
together in a sociotechnical system. To prove these points, I will present an historical 
case study research on the development of security for a family of computer 
installations know as timesharing developed in the 1960s and 1970s. Data for this study 
comes from scientific publications on timesharing security. For the analysis, I couple a 
genealogical approach (Foucault, 1972; Parikka, 2007) with the principle of theoretical 
agnosticism from Actor-Network Theory (ANT) (Callon, 1984 and 1987).  
Due to the innovative networked and multiuser nature of timesharing systems, 
engineers had to face a completely novel form of rule-breaking behaviour1: 
unauthorised access to computer resources, done by an emerging criminal actor, the 
malicious user. Thus engineers working on timesharing were the first to deal with this 
                                                          
1 I am avoiding using the word crime explicitly here because the kinds of behaviours in question were 
only codified as crimes decades later with the development of computer law, e.g. the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (1986) in the USA. 
 
 
novel form of rule-breaking behaviour emerging from a new configuration of computers 
and networks. This is an excellent NoC case study that will support the initial 
development of the notion of the engineer-criminologist, showing that timesharing 
engineers were using concepts very similar to a criminological approach known as 
Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) and that these concepts did allow them to explain 
the roles of criminal humans and technologies simultaneously. 
 
The novelty of cybercrime 
I will now consider a number of criminological contributions related with the NoC. 
Some deploy the metaphors “old and new wine” to categorise whether cybercrime is the 
same as traditional crime or something new. Much of this literature also relates with an 
influential theory known as Routine Activity Theory (RAT) (Cohen and Felson, 1979). 
I also include the only criminological publication which I found that considers the role 
of technology (van der Wagen and Pieters, 2015) openly critiquing RAT views on the 
NoC. 
RAT authors, in general criminology, theorise that the “opportunity makes the 
thief” (Felson and Clarke, 1998) where nearly anyone presented with an opportunity to 
commit a crime (C) will do so, even righteous citizens. This opportunity is exploited by 
motivated offenders (O) when there is a suitable target (T) (e.g. a person, an object like 
a car or a place like a house) and the absence of capable guardians (G) (e.g. policemen 
or home owners) able to prevent the offender in exploiting the target. This is 
summarised with the formula O+T-G=C (Cohen and Felson, 1979).  RAT considers 
crime from the perspective of the offender’s bounded rational understanding of the 
situation. RAT is also concerned with a description of the target from the offender 
perspective using, for example, the VIVA model – to describe the Value (how the 
 
 
offender values the target), Inertia (how the offender sees the limits of moving a target 
e.g. it’s weight, size), Visibility (e.g. is it in plain view or away from it) and Access (e.g. 
the target is fenced or locked away or easily accessible by anyone) (Cohen and Felson, 
1979).  
The issue of whether new criminological theory is needed to explicate the NoC 
has been categorised with labels such as transformationists or continuists by Leukfeldt 
and Yar (2016). This debate started when an influential continuist position was 
advanced by Grabosky (2001), for which it is possible to apply the RAT formula to the 
study of cybercrime. He argued that although on the surface we may see differences 
between cyber and traditional crimes, the motives driving criminals do not change: 
technology changes but human nature does not. A fraud – cyber or not – can still be 
explained as having financial strain as a motivation. Other cybercrimes, like traditional 
crimes, are motivated by greed or lust.  For Grabosky cybercrime is “old wine in a new 
bottle”.  
Wall (1999) proposed that cybercrime is comparable to a “new wine”, not 
contained by any physical space (“no bottles”) and whose meanings shifts when moving 
from terrestrial contexts to cyberspace. Yar (2005) testing the RAT formula for the 
study of cybercrime also compared cybercrime to “old wine in no bottles”. According to 
Yar, since the Internet changes the spatio-temporality of the situation, informational 
targets are always available to anyone connected to the network(s) and the offenders’ 
capacity to commit crimes is not limited by space or time. For him, inertia of a target 
also does not apply as information is not weighted down by bulk if compared to 
physical targets. Informational targets instead still have value for criminals. Thus, for 
Yar, only some aspects of the VIVA model are applicable and criminology needs to 
reconsider existing theories. 
 
 
Holt, Bossler and Siegfrid-Spellar (2015) reviewed a number of approaches 
showing that criminologists have largely used existing theories to study cybercrime. 
The authors also consider that cybercrime presents “instances of new wine” in relation 
to certain technological components, such as malware. While a parallel between 
traditional and cyber-frauds may be easily drawn, it is more difficult to compare 
malware to other terrestrial crimes. The same authors used RAT (Bossler and Holt, 
2009; Holt and Bossler, 2013) to study the only remaining rational human component of 
the crime situation: the victims’ rational decision-making (e.g. whether victims update 
their anti-virus) which could lead to malware victimisation. 
van der Wagen and Pieters (2015) focused on malware agency, noticing that 
much criminology does overlook the role of technology in favour of human-centric 
explanations and relegates technology as either a tool in the hands of a motivated 
offender or just as a background element of crime. The authors used ANT standard 
vocabulary, with concepts such as translation or hybrids, to study botnets, network of 
malware infected computers used for criminal activities such as Distributed Denial of 
Service. The authors argue that with a botnet, criminal agency is hybrid and not fixed 
once and for all, but shifts alongside the process of creation of a criminal technical 
infrastructure.  
 
Analytical Perspective 
The NoC notion seems to point to an evident technological component, together with a 
social/human one. In criminology we have however limited scholarship which considers 
a symmetrical treatment of humans and non-humans. In the introduction, I observed that 
criminologists are not the only scholars dealing with cybercrime. Another discipline is 
information security. This paper focuses on how information security engineers define 
 
 
what in RAT approaches is considered the crime situation. A first interesting aspect to 
note is that in criminological publications, information security is often relegated to a 
few lines, vaguely noticing that this is part of the guardian in the RAT formula 
(Grabosky, 2001; Yar, 2005), that it deals with the technical side of things (Bossler and 
Holt, 2009), that technical guardianship has almost no effect in reducing victimisation 
(Leukfeldt and Yar, 2016). These claims obscure some important aspects. Information 
security focuses on creating mechanisms for preventing unauthorised access and 
subsequent illegal or rule-breaking use of computing and network resources. Ensuring 
that information is not exposed to unauthorised parties requires not exposing 
informational targets to motivated offenders, located inside (so called insider threats) or 
outside an organisation. The focuses of criminology (of cybercrime) and information 
security largely overlap, with the latter focussing on the design of secure systems and 
the former on understanding the criminal. I propose to conduct an historical-
genealogical study of information security for reconsidering some aspects of the NoC 
and propose a new concept. 
I undertake research on the development of security for the timesharing systems 
which happened in the late sixties and early seventies of last century. Timesharing 
systems were the first to present innovations such as networked communication and 
multiuser computers. In that period, the networked transmission of communication 
came with the anxiety that previously established borders were becoming trespassed 
(Parikka, 2007). Timesharing engineers had to face for the first time novel forms of 
rule-breaking behaviour such as unauthorised access to information, destruction of 
content and denial of service (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975). The notion of the user 
acting with malicious/criminal intent was formulated in association to timesharing for 
the first time (Anderson, 1972).  
 
 
We can learn much about the NoC if we adopt a genealogical approach to 
information security and to the case of timesharing. Genealogy aims to account for the 
historical constitution of discursive practices and for the conditions of existence for 
truth and meaning in those practices (Foucault, 1972). Genealogy is a non-subject 
centric historical perspective and archaeology is the method of such history. Parikka 
(2007, p. XXXII), explicitly citing Foucault (2000), pointed that the function of (media) 
archaeology is to look at the immanent strategies producing reality and the goal for the 
analyst is to rediscover the connections of facts that at a given moment establish what 
subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary. 
The approach I follow is more modest than those of Foucault and Parikka. For 
instance, Parikka conducted the archaeology of digital contagions over several decades, 
across different media, from scientific publications, to science fiction books to movies. 
My starting point comes from Actor-Network Theory, in which we can conceptualize an 
archaeological approach where the processes through which knowledge becomes stable 
are localised, for example at the level of a laboratory (Law, 2004). 
I start from the theoretical agnosticism principle of ANT (Callon, 1984) which 
states that theories should not be used a-prioristically on phenomena. This principle 
acknowledges the importance of following social actors’ production of methods for 
creating social order. I use this principle as the basis for the genealogical study of 
timesharing security. A narrow interpretation of this principle would lead to using the 
original ANT vocabulary, with concepts such as inscription or translation. However, 
this vocabulary is not prescriptive, just convenient (Latour and Akirch, 1992). When 
presenting my analysis, I will use a criminological vocabulary while respecting the 
theoretical agnosticism.  
 
 
In a seminal paper, Callon (1987) applied the agnosticism principle to the case 
study of the development of an electric car in France, showing that: 
engineers who elaborate a new technology as well as all those who participate at 
one time or another in its design, development and diffusion constantly construct 
hypothesis and forms of argument that pull these participants into the field of 
sociological analysis. Whether they want it or not, they are transformed into 
sociologists, or what I call engineer-sociologists.  
Callon showed that two different groups of engineers came up with competing visions 
about the role of the electric car in the French society, visions which Callon recognised 
as being similar to theories formulated by two known sociologists, Bourdieu and 
Touraine. One interpretation about structural changes in consumption (an implicit 
Bourdieusian view) was embraced by engineers at Electricité De France (the company 
sponsoring the car). An opposite view was embraced by engineers at Renault tasked 
with manufacturing the car. At some time in the project, the Renault engineers 
postulated that no changes would occur to consumption patterns (an implicit Tourainian 
view) and that the electric car would fail. By making the car (or making it failing) these 
engineers were at once designing a technological innovation and its social environment. 
From this insight, I then propose that as much as we have engineer-sociologists we may 
have information security engineers as criminologists. In other words, in information 
security the aetiological explanation of cybercrime may be accompanied and become a 
justification of design processes, whereby engineer-criminologists simultaneously 
design solutions for preventing crime and use constructs similar to criminology for 
explaining their crime prevention strategies. It is with the concept of the engineer-
criminologist that I connect a criminological vocabulary – traditionally subject-centric – 
with the non-human aspects of computer and networks. 
 
 
 
My data is a textual corpus derived from a range of relevant publications from 
the core period of development of timesharing protection (1965 to 1975), which have 
been retrieved with a search in scholarly databases. I selected a total of 22 documents 
suitable for my research (see Sources in References section), amounting to over 500 
pages analysed. Most are research papers (e.g. Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975; Ware, 
1967a), some are technical reports (e.g. Anderson, 1972; Parker, 1973a) and others are 
reflective papers on timesharing and societal changes (e.g. Baran, 1965). 
 
The security engineer as criminologist  
Timesharing systems were being hypothesised as early as the 1955 as a type of 
“operating system that permits each user of a computer to behave as though he were in 
sole control of a computer” (McCarthy, 1983). Computer installations were at the time 
expensive and available mostly in large Universities, large companies and military 
bases. They were a unique large mainframe operated as batch processing. Programmers 
would create their programs first (for example on punched cards) and then these were 
collected and executed in batches on the mainframe by a technician who would then 
report back the results (see Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne, 2004, Chapter 22). This 
approach would not permit direct access to programming for programmers, leading to 
long waiting times for results. In time, it became clear that computational resources 
were not used optimally. Security was also largely a problem of shielding the 
mainframe from unauthorised outside physical access, where only authorised 
technicians had cleared access (Parikka, 2007).  
Timesharing is a radically different concept where resources (especially Central 
Processing Unit’s time and memory), e.g. for executing programs, are shared among a 
number of users connecting using remote dummy terminals (Figure 1). Timesharing 
 
 
allows direct and interactive access to programming and multiple users and computer 
programs share the computer resources at any one time (Silberschatz et al., 2004). 
Further, as users interact with terminals, timesharing included novel issues related to the 
exchange of data over networks. Terminals could be located within the same building as 
the mainframe but also in remote organisations. Thus, compared to batch programming, 
with timesharing we have a novel reconfiguration of technologies (mainframes 
connected to networks of terminals) and people (users with direct programming access). 
While the mainframe would still need to be physically protected, direct programming 
access posed new security problems: 
This "sheltered" approach promotes one-at-a-time, batch usage of the facility. 
Modern hardware and software technology has moved forward to more powerful 
and cost/effective time-shared, multi-access, multiprogrammed systems.  However, 
three features of such systems pose a challenge to the sheltered mode of protection: 
(1) concurrent multiple users with different access rights operating remote from the 
shielded room; (2) multiple programs with different access rights co-resident in 
memory; and (3) multiple files of different data sensitivities simultaneously 
accessible. (Weissman 1969, p. 120) 
 
Interestingly in the early years, some timesharing systems were built without security 
and this was only added as a post hoc development. These were defined as: 
Unprotected systems: Some systems have no provision for preventing a determined 
user from having access to every piece of information stored in the system (Saltzer 
and Schroeder, 1975, p. 1280) 
 
Many security issues – or better protection as it was called at the time – arose in an 
emergent manner as outcomes of the design of functional timesharing systems, where 
 
 
there was a need to protect users from each other and to protect the mainframe from 
users and programs accessing resources.  
 
 
Figure 1. Timesharing: multiple users sharing computing resources via remote 
terminals. 
 
In timesharing, data files, software libraries, user programs, computer memory 
and the operating system are all located and/or executed on the mainframe. In a 
timesharing system with no protection, any user could in principle access or manipulate 
any of those resources. Thus, by accident, a user could read the private files of another 
user, or even delete them (unauthorised access). A user could also accidentally crash the 
entire system by running faulty programs (denial of service). This is where the need to 
create protection among users and between users and the mainframe emerged. While 
protection was needed because of potential accidental actions, it became clear that those 
same actions could also be conducted with explicit malicious intent. Engineers were 
thus facing a completely novel form of rule-breaking behaviour, emerging from a new 
configuration of technologies and people. This was explained in the shift from single 
user to multi-user computers: 
 
 
Present day computer systems are largely closed use systems; that is, systems 
serving a homogeneously cleared user population. The major threat to these 
systems is that of external penetration. […] In effect, the defense against external 
penetration surrounds the system and its user community with a barrier that must 
be breached before the system can be compromised. (Anderson, 1972, p. 1) 
 
In the batch configuration, the main risk thus comes from external penetrations, 
countered by a barrier composed of physical, procedural and communication 
techniques. On the contrary: 
The malicious user concept arises from the requirements for open use systems. […] 
By this we recognize that the nature of shared use multilevel computer systems 
present to a malicious user a unique opportunity for attempting to subvert through 
programming the mechanism upon which security depends (i. e. the control of the 
computer vested in the operating system). This threat, coupled with the 
concentration of the application (data, control system, etc.) in one place (the 
computer system) makes computers a uniquely attractive target for malicious 
(hostile) action. (Anderson, 1972, p. 3) 
 
In this fundamental statement, Anderson argues that the malicious user emerges with 
the new requirements for timesharing systems, which afford direct programming access 
via networked terminals coupled with a concentration of resources. In the context of 
batch installations the malicious user is not a criminal category per se as the users are a 
security cleared population. The malicious user is instead someone operating within the 
perimeter of a timesharing system (Anderson, 1972: 58): 
It is given therefore that a hostile third party has direct programming access to a 
targeted computing system. It is the direct programming access to a computer 
system that constitutes the principal security threat. 
 
 
 
Properties of this completely novel threat to computer systems are then emerging 
together with the very same design of systems that can be programmed directly. 
Anderson explicitly says that there is a new “opportunity” (emphasis in italics added) 
coming from the coupling of a potential malicious offender and an attractive “target” 
(emphasis added), multiuser timesharing. This terminology matches that of RAT and is 
used similarly, highlighting the work of what I call engineer-criminologists. 
 
Situational Crime Prevention and the engineer-criminologists 
An influential extension of RAT is known as Situational Crime Prevention 
(SCP), an approach originally developed in the late seventies and early eighties of the 
last century (Clarke, 1980). By using theoretical agnosticism, it is possible to see that 
engineers working on timesharing security were conceptualising their work in a manner 
very similar with how SCP scholars see the criminal situation. In an open critique of 
what he calls “modern criminology” Clarke (1997), the main author behind SCP, argues 
that SCP differs in two ways from much criminology. The first deviation is the focus on 
the crime situation rather on the criminal. Most criminology does not consider that the 
rational offender acts in a situation where opportunities emerge and will instead 
concentrate on which specific individual traits and social influences lead to crime. 
Crime is an emergent property of the situation where rational actors (the crime 
aetiology) take advantage of opportunities coming from the availability of targets and 
the absence of guardians (Clarke, 1997). There is a second critique to “modern 
criminology” which Clarke (1997) advances: that much emphasis has been placed on 
abstract measures for controlling the offender, rather than on modifying specific 
situations to prevent crime. Clarke mentions legislation and morality as abstract control 
measures. The increase of punishments in legislations is an example. An offender 
 
 
presented with an opportunity to commit a crime will likely take that opportunity 
without thinking much about abstract laws. SCP promotes instead the modification of 
the situation in order to reduce crime opportunities. Therefore SCP argues that formal 
and informal controls divert view from more efficient ways of control: the “routine 
precautions” which impact the behaviour of the potential offender. 
If we look back at the statement by Anderson (1972) quoted in the previous 
section, he was using nearly the same vocabulary as SCP and RAT, except that no 
prevalence is given to the role of the offender. For Anderson, the opportunity is the 
sociotechnical articulation of design and people: a “new criminal” (the malicious user) 
emerges as outcome of a technological innovation (from batch to Timesharing) and 
from the presence of a technological guardian (control mechanisms) which may fail. 
Nowadays, this novel threat is known as the insider threat, the user that within the 
perimeter of an organisation commits criminal acts. 
Timesharing engineers were thus facing similar problems to SCP scholars. We 
can consider the anticipated situation in which functional timesharing systems were 
designed without protection, and ask whether legislation would suffice to ensure order. 
Baran (1965) presented an analogy between rule-breaking behaviours in timesharing 
and the increase in obscene phone calls at the time, discussing that the response to 
obscene calls from authorities was that of increasing the penalties: 
It is a rare event when person making an obscene telephone call is caught, so the 
deterrent effect is almost nil. But an increased penalty hidden in a law book is the 
standard legal response to a basically technological/social problem. This writer 
would prefer to see technology which created this problem be required to provide 
more effective safeguards. (Baran, 1965, p. 49) 
 
 
 
The writer makes it clear that it may be preferable to turn to the practical engineering of 
security than to penalties for addressing problems which are at once social and 
technical: 
 
each telephone (or at least those plagued with these calls) should have a button 
which when pressed bridges the call to a bank of recorders at the police station and 
a teletypewriter message with the name, address, and telephone number of the 
calling party transmitted to the nearest police car. It wouldn't take long to clean up 
the undesired callers. (Baran, 1965, p. 49) 
 
The writer argues that telephones should have a button that the victim could use to 
report obscene callers and that this would be more effective than penalties. By extension 
of the analogy, order in timesharing should be created with designed solutions rather 
than with legislation and then: 
a wonderful opportunity awaits the computer engineer to exercise a new form of 
social responsibility (Baran, 1965, p.  49) 
We have engineers offering a situational criminological perspective on the novel threat 
of the malicious user of timesharing. They offer a sociotechnical view on the crime 
opportunity, criminals, targets and guardians. There is a focus on defining the 
opportunity for a criminal action and the need for counteracting this action. Solutions to 
crime cannot come from formal controls on the offenders (penalties, criminal justice), 
but from engineering technical guardians. There also is recognition of the new social 
responsibility of engineer-criminologists: that of enabling social order. 
 
 
 
Defining threats and countermeasures 
Engineer-criminologists’ main task was that of designing a technologically capable 
guardian. Browne (1972, p. 3), citing Sorensen (1972), defines the design of 
security/protection as a trade-off: 
the tradeoffs of cost vs. efficiency are of great importance. It is quite easy (and 
expensive) to put a lead wall around a computer system, thus insuring absolute 
protection. Of course no one can get any jobs through either. The key factors are to 
determine the value of information, then quantify the effect of having it lost, stolen, 
or destroyed. Then the cost of implementing protection can be weighed against the 
cost of loss 
 
The process requires: (1) assessing the computer installation for risks related to theft 
and other hazards; (2) evaluating the security measures needed to protect the computer; 
(3) evaluating each measure in relation to the risk and costs, before deciding. This cost-
benefit approach nowadays goes by the name of information technology threat/risk 
assessment (Bayne, 2002). Ware (1967, p. 288) remarked that this economical-rational 
principle of designing protection seems, conversely, to drive malicious users: 
In the end, an engineering trade-off question must be assessed. The value of private 
information to an outsider2 will determine the resources he is willing to expend to 
acquire it. In turn, the value of the information to its owner is related to what he is 
willing to pay to protect it.  […] Perhaps this game-like situation can be played out 
to arrive at a rational basis for establishing the level of protection. 
 
                                                          
2 Here “outsider” refers to someone outside another user’s private information within a system.  
 
 
 
Engineer-criminologists conceptualised the criminal as a rational actor, like 
criminologists. Assessing the value of information for an offender (like in the VIVA 
model) and the possible threats in a rational manner is a precondition for a design which 
can mitigate the threats within the boundaries of available resources. Design of 
protection, which is a process for reducing crime opportunities, is about understanding 
the situation and potential threats before making an intervention.  
Security engineers categorised the threats to information under three main areas 
(Anderson, 1972), still used today: 
(1) Unauthorized information release.  
(2) Unauthorized information modification.  
(3) Unauthorized denial of use. 
Where, clarify Salzer and Schroeder (1975, p. 1280): 
The term “unauthorized” in the three categories listed above means that release, 
modification, or denial of use occurs contrary to the desire of the person who controls the 
information, possibly even contrary to the constraints supposedly enforced by the system.  
 
Again, we see an emphasis on the need to understand the target not just from the angle 
of the offender but also of the owner and even of the technical guardian. Anderson 
(1972) notes further that the tripartite distinction of threats does not provide the basis 
for design. Thus, engineer-criminologists devised top-down and bottom-up approaches. 
Top down approaches depart from a formalised model about a secure system and then 
protection requirements will follow (Lampson, 1974). Bottom-up approaches start by 
“identifying insights by studying example systems” (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975, p. 
1283). This part of the analysis is empirical and studies real systems and incidents 
 
 
before deciding which protection measures to implement. This analysis appears similar 
to the SCP approach for reducing the crime opportunities in specific situations. 
 
Countermeasures and Opportunity-Reducing Techniques 
Clarke (1997) emphasises that SCP is driven by action-research in order to 
devise solutions, whereby the routine activities of people are modified for reducing the 
opportunities of crime. An example related to the reduction of property crimes is what 
“the Post Office did when they virtually eliminated theft from telephone kiosks by 
replacing the vulnerable aluminium coin boxes with much stronger steel ones” (Clarke, 
1980, p. 141). This amounts to hardening the crime target in the eyes of criminals. 
Another example relates to the fact that “apartment blocks with doormen are less 
vulnerable to burglary” (Clarke, 1980, p. 142); that is, a guardian brings increased risks 
for the offender. SCP seeks to make an intervention on a potential crime situation where 
criminologists, first understand what would constitute an opportunity for the rational 
criminal (e.g. the aluminium box) and then modify the target (e.g. a steel box) to reduce 
the opportunity. The SCP approach is based on the collection of data about specific 
crimes, an analysis of the conditions that permit crime, a study of possible 
countermeasures also based on rational cost evaluation, before the implementation of 
measures (Clarke, 1997). 
The bottom-up approach to threat analysis presents nearly the same traits. 
Engineering security requires rational decision making and empirical research focussed 
on understanding how much the offender is willing to go to access a resource as well as 
how much the owner is willing to invest in security. Parker (1973b, p. 5), writing about 
the empirical approach to threat analysis, noted that: 
 
 
 
Real cases are superior to theoretical penetration exercises in some ways because they 
are occurring more frequently, they embody rational as well as unpredictable human 
behavior under natural stress, and they occur in real, undisturbed environments. 
Theoretical exercises are superior to real cases by being able to test specific security 
features under rigorous conditions in experimental systems.  
 
Empirical research is useful to understand human behaviour which may be rational but 
also unpredictable and for the identification of threats based on these behaviours. 
Anderson (1972, p. 22) also explains that: 
 
The technical threat in contemporary systems posed by a malicious user is that because 
the systems are produced using ad hoc security rules, a penetrator will find a design or 
implementation flaw, or induce a 'trap door' situation to obtain supervisory control of the 
system.  
 
Threats come from flaws in the ad hoc design of timesharing and direct programming 
access to the system by the potential perpetrator. For example, a trap door is an 
undocumented feature of a computer system, inserted on purpose by a potentially 
malicious programmer, which is not properly controlled. Often trap doors are inserted 
during the development of the operating system itself, or by exploiting software flaws 
for example in operating system registers, or even inserting the trap door in the software 
compiler of the operating system (see for an overview Karger and Schell, 1974). A trap 
door would allow the malicious programmer to take control of the entire system, in 
supervisor mode (Anderson, 1972).  
Design flaws which can be exploited with direct programming are what in 
today’s information security vocabulary are called vulnerabilities. Writers at the time 
 
 
did detail a number of further explicit threats. There is not enough space here to see 
these in details, but many are common in contemporary Internet and computer systems, 
for example trojan horses (Anderson, 1972), masquerading (e.g. a terminal) as 
something else to steal information (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975), and man in the 
middle attacks (Petersen and Turn, 1967). 
Data collection on threats and analysis of the situation for a computer 
installation lead to the design of countermeasures, procedures and techniques to 
mitigate threats. The concept of countermeasures resembles what in SCP are called 
Opportunity-Reducing Techniques (ORTs) (see for an overview Clarke, 1997). Since 
the problem is to study the situation and intervene in modifying it when there are 
potential crime opportunities, SCP scholars have identified a number of heuristic 
techniques to guide practical interventions. SCP scholars can deploy one or more of the 
25 ORTs that have been formalised to modify the situation and reduce crime 
opportunity. Although there is not enough space here to describe these ORTs in full, we 
have already touched upon some examples: hardening the target (e.g. a steel box rather 
than an aluminium one) or introducing a guardian (e.g. the doorman). Returning to 
timesharing, Turn and Petersen (1970, p. 4) defined the objectives of countermeasures 
as would any criminologists working with ORTs: 
 
The objective is not absolute security -this can never be achieved, but rather an increase 
of the cost of penetration, the "work factor', to a level where the expected payoff becomes 
relatively small. At the same time, a balance must be maintained between the cost of 
countermeasures and the value of the protected information. 
 
Protection is very much about increasing the cost for crime perpetration (for example by 
hardening the target), while adopting a rational trade-off on costs. Saltzer and Schroeder 
 
 
(1975, p. 1284) summarised the situation of protecting the target with an explanatory 
metaphor: 
 
Conceptually, then, it is necessary to build an impenetrable wall around each distinct 
object that warrants separate protection, construct a door in the wall through which access 
can be obtained, and post a guard at the door to control its use.  
 
Protection countermeasures primarily focus on authentication (the technical guard 
identifies the user with something e.g. a password, to avoid exploitation of flaws) and 
access control (the engineer constructs a “door” which permits direct programming 
when authorised). These countermeasures are techniques which we can recognise also 
in SCP ORTs, where authentication matches a technique called “screen exits” and 
access control equates to the technique “access control of facilities”, both under what 
SCP scholars call “Increasing the Effort” (for the perpetration of a crime). Engineer-
criminologists also considered a range of other countermeasures, though there is no 
space to consider them all here. 
 
Symmetrical countermesures 
To illustrate authentication and access control we can consider the Graham–Denning 
model (1972) as an interesting example of how timesharing engineers did anticipate 
with design solutions rule-breaking behaviours, while at the same time allowing 
legitimate programming of the system. These authors observed that security could be 
conceptualised in a model with three factors: a subject, an object and a set of rules 
enforced by a special operating system program called ‘monitor’. Rules relate to the 
capacity to create and delete subjects (e.g. computer admins creating new user 
 
 
credentials) and objects (e.g. user creating data files, software or memory locations) as 
well as giving subjects the capacity to access objects. 
 
I want to emphasise here the resonance with another SCP claim that “situational 
prevention does not draw hard distinctions between criminals and others” (Clarke, 1997, 
p. 4). We can recognise a form of symmetry in this and a degree of agnosticism: in SCP 
no a-priori distinction is made between who is criminal and who is not. Criminals and 
non-criminals emerge from the situation. 
 
Also in the Graham–Denning model no distinction is made a-priori between 
criminals and others. The goal is to devise countermeasures (protection, via the monitor 
operation) to facilitate a rule-abiding access that subjects can make to objects. The 
protection must also be capable of ensuring that no unauthorised access (accidental or 
not) will take place. In simplified terms, we may consider two subjects, Bob and Alice 
and two objects (File 1 and File2) on which different levels of access are established. 
For instance, Alice can both read and modify File 1 but Bob can only read File1, 
whereas for File2 Alice can only read this object and Bob has no access at all. This 
situation can be then mapped onto what in security is called an Access Control Matrix 
(Table 1). 
 
 File 1 File 2 
Bob Read <no access> 
Alice Read, Write Read 
Table 1. Simple access control matrix with two subjects 
 
 
 
Thus, if Bob (a subject) attempts to write on File1 (an object) - whether incidentally or 
maliciously - the monitor enforces access control and prevents Bob from doing that. 
Bob may indeed be attempting to modify a register of the system in order to place a trap 
door, but he may just be trying to access the file incidentally. However, the model 
implementation does not need to decide a-priori whether Bob is a criminal or not: it just 
prevents him accessing a critical part of the system. The symmetry postulated by SCP is 
used also by engineer-criminologists where their model does not distinguish a-priori 
between criminals and others. Furthermore, we have observed earlier the difficulties 
that much of criminology has in reconciling subject-centric theorisation with malicious 
non-human software. In the Graham–Denning model, a subject may be a user but also a 
process, whereby a process is an active computer program (e.g. a program using a 
software library available as a service on the system). The model proposed by engineer-
criminologists does not distinguish a-priori whether it is a human-subject or a program-
subject conducting an action on an object like a file. This is a second symmetry of the 
model. Interestingly there is a third symmetry in the model, namely that no a-priori 
distinction is made on whether a process/program is malicious or not. 
 
 
Figure 2. The three symmetries of the Denning-Graham model 
 
If in the Access Control Matrix (Table 1) we replace Bob and Alice with Process1 and 
Process2 and we have Process1 trying to modify the File1 (e.g. accessing a software 
library trying to alter it by e.g. implanting a back boor), then the monitor will not open a 
 
 
door giving access to the object/resource. This will prevent a potential rule-breaking 
behaviour by potentially malicious software. Again, whether a software is malicious or 
not is an emerging outcome of the situation. 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The contribution of this paper was to better understand what in criminology is defined as 
the Novelty of Cybercrime and start developing a sociotechnical approach to it. 
Criminology is traditionally subject-centric and regardless of whether it perceives or not 
novelties in cybercrime phenomena, it still sees the rational human criminal as 
explanatory factor of a crime. While this approach is justifiable from a disciplinary 
perspective, it limits our capacity to fully grasp the situational and emergent 
sociotechnical aspects of a cybercrime opportunity. van der Wagen and Pieters (2015) are 
right in noticing that most approaches in criminology attribute all the weight of a crime 
to humans. Consequently, we inevitably fall into investigation about motives, while 
overlooking aspects of technological agencies. In criminology, it remains difficult 
however to make room for approaches addressing the NoC which can treat symmetrically 
humans and nonhumans and for alternative vocabularies like those proposed by ANT. 
Instead, the criminological vocabulary is already well suited to talk about crimes.  
This paper has shown that the criminological vocabulary can account for the 
sociotechnical association of the rational criminal and the novel changes in the design of 
systems. Using a modest genealogical approach and starting from the ANT agnosticism 
principle, we have followed security engineers working on timesharing systems. They 
stated they were facing a new criminal situation: “a new wine”, the coupling of malicious 
 
 
users and timesharing requirements. Engineer-criminologists saw a mutual co-
construction of the criminal and the computer-network environment where direct 
programming access via networked terminals created the conditions for malicious user to 
emerge. Engineer-criminologists of timesharing came up with a “new bottle” to contain 
the “new wine”, composed of two elements. Firstly a perspective for which the solution 
to malicious users is not in formal controls (the Law) but in designing the (computer-
network) environment; secondly a set of countermeasures selected depending on an 
analysis of possible risks/threats and based on a rationalisation of costs. We have then 
seen how engineers embraced a situational perspective largely similar to the 
criminological perspectives of SCP and RAT, while at the same time remaining 
symmetrical in talking about people and technologies. 
To understand the relevance of this result and how this connects to theory, we 
can reconsider Latour’s (1990) well-known example of the hotel manager who has the 
problem of convincing his clients to bring the key back to the reception. The clients are 
the deviant offenders, the hotel keys are the target and the manager is the not very 
capable guardian. In RAT studies, these three elements are given (i.e. the rational 
criminal, the VIVA aspects of the target) and it is the interplay among them which leads 
to the emergent property of a crime opportunity: the clients do not bring the key back 
because the guardian is not capable of securing the target, thus the formula O (clients) + 
T (keys) – G (manager) = Deviance. In Latour’s example, however, at one point the 
manager introduces an innovation, which also is an Opportunity-Reducing Technique 
increasing the Inertia of the target: the addition of a metal weight, makes it 
uncomfortable for offenders to carry the keys around. The innovation restructures the 
entire situation and the roles: the guardian becomes capable, the key is much less a 
target and deviant clients become rule observers. What this paper has shown then is that 
 
 
the O+T-G=C formula can be used to understand the symmetries in the NoC. We need 
to consider that elements of the formula may translate due to innovations - the novelties 
we are looking to address - which lead to a wider reshape of the situation. Then, rather 
than seeing the situation only from the perspective of the offenders, we should look at 
how novelties (very often designed non-humans) restructure all the roles, including that 
of the offender. In other words, the O+T-G=C formula is a translation process. SCP, 
differently from RAT, operates with a slightly different approach as criminologists 
study the crime situation but then also make interventions with Opportunity-Reducing 
Techniques. To an extent they are the engineer-criminologists of terrestrial crimes. SCP 
has not been used much in cybercrime studies however, beyond some contributions 
related to how organisations deal with non-technical aspects of security, especially 
focusing on insider threats (Willison and Siponen, 2009). This limited use of SCP in 
cybercrime studies may be due to the considerations that security engineers occupy the 
situational crime prevention space in digital environments.  
While a genealogical approach coupled with the agnosticism principle to the 
study of security may not have been the only way to reach the same results, the 
approach presents fundamental advantages. In addition to taking an open ended 
perspective on theory development, it has allowed us to reconsider ideas that nowadays 
are stable knowledge but that were far from obvious in the past. The first such idea is 
that programmers, including malicious ones, can directly program and even take control 
of a computer and that they can do so remotely using computer networks such as the 
Internet. Linking this to the current situation, Timesharing systems also contained the 
kernel of some contemporary applications where many users share a common pool of 
resources. Cloud computing is an example, where for instance Software as a Service 
(SaaS) is offered to a multitude of end-users (Nemani, 2011). Moreover, in some 
 
 
Timesharing, security was initially overlooked or had to be retrofitted. This seems to be 
a situation which has presented itself again, for example with the Internet of Things, 
where many devices lack a number of security requirements (HPE, 2015). 
 Like most research this study also has some limitations. One aspect is certainly 
related with presenting a single case study. However, we should consider this work the 
first step toward bridging the NoC problem with a sociotechnical perspective and call 
for the conduction of further research. In my view, van der Wagen and Pieters (2015) 
also took a relevant step in this direction, but the limitation to their work is in using the 
standard ANT vocabulary, which does not facilitate broader dialogue with criminology 
and information security. Future directions for research will include testing the 
symmetrical treatment of the O+T-G=C translation formula in other case studies and 
contexts. An historical genealogical perspective may remain fundamental here, but 
approaching contemporary cases related with the Internet and novel arrangements of 
Information Technologies could also prove important. 
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